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We show that managerial overconfidence, which has been found to influence a number of 
corporate financial decisions, also affects corporate risk management. We find that managers 
increase their speculative activities using derivatives following speculative gains, while they do 
not reduce their speculative activities following speculative losses. This asymmetric response 
follows from selective self-attribution: successes tend to be attributed to one’s own skill, while 
failures tend to be attributed to bad luck. Thus, our results show that managerial behavioral 
biases can also impact corporate risk management. 
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1. Introduction 
The traditional theories of corporate risk management show that reducing risk can increase 
shareholder value by reducing expected taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, information 
asymmetries, and payments to undiversified stakeholders of the firm.
1 However, empirical tests 
of the predictions of these theories have met with only limited success.
2 While each empirical 
study uncovers evidence that can be interpreted as being consistent with one or more of the 
theories of hedging, there is little consistency across studies. In addition, much of the variation in 
firms’ derivatives strategies, both cross-sectionally and over time, remains unexplained. This 
disparity between theory and practice is remarkably consistent with an argument advanced nearly 
50 years ago by Working (1962), that the “traditional” risk avoidance notion of hedging – 
matching one risk with an opposing risk – is deficient when it comes to explaining hedging 
behavior in practice. Indeed, the growing evidence that many managers systematically 
incorporate their market views into their risk management programs,
3 but fail to generate 
positive cash flows from this “selective hedging” strategy on average,
4 suggests that managers 
deviate at times from the pure rationality assumed by the neoclassical theories of hedging. 
In this paper, we study the risk management activities of a sample of North American 
gold mining firms and present new evidence, which suggests that behavioral managerial biases 
affect corporate risk management strategies. A growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
studies the impact of managerial biases on corporate decisions.
5 Several managerial biases, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Stultz (1984), Smith and Stultz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), DeMarzo and Duffie 
(1995), Leland (1998), Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) and Mello and Parsons (2000). 
2 See, for example, Tufano (1996), Mian (1996), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Graham and Smith (1999), 
Haushalter (2000) and Graham and Rogers (2002). 
3 See, for example, Dolde (1993), Stultz (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), and Glaum (2002). 
4 See Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006). 
5 Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on behavioral corporate 
finance.   4
including loss aversion, mental accounting, and overconfidence, have been found to affect 
corporate investment policies, capital structure decisions, mergers and acquisitions, security 
offerings, and investment bank relationships.
6 Given that the empirical evidence in favor of the 
neoclassical theories of hedging is weak, it seems warranted to examine whether behavioral 
managerial biases affect corporate risk management decisions.  
In particular, we focus on the managerial overconfidence hypothesis (e.g., Heaton (2002); 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008)), which implies that managers may be overconfident in their 
ability to beat the market, engaging in excessive position shifting under the mistaken belief that 
they have a relative information advantage. In particular, overconfidence is expected to increase 
following successes, but decrease less (if at all) following failures. This asymmetric response 
follows from selective self-attribution: successes tend to be attributed to one’s own skill, while 
failures tend to be attributed to bad luck. Indeed, we find that managers tend to increase the level 
of their speculative activities using derivatives following speculative gains, but do not reduce 
their speculative activities following speculative losses. This asymmetric response, which 
persists after controlling for firm fixed-effects and several other time-varying firm 
characteristics, is difficult to reconcile with rational theories of risk management, but is 
consistent with the presence of managerial overconfidence.  
The results are significant because they show that managerial behavioral biases can also 
impact corporate risk management. Recognizing that managers sometimes deviate from strict 
rationality is likely to improve our understanding of corporate risk management decisions and 
help close the gap between the observed practice of risk management and the extant neoclassical 
theories that seek to explain it.  
                                                 
6 Studies include Roll (1986), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Heaton (2002), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005), 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007), Billett and Qian (2008), Goel and 
Thakor (2008), Sautner and Weber (2009), and Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2009).   5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature and derives testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample, the construction of our 
variables and the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on how 
speculation responds to speculative gains and losses. Section 5 summarizes the results and 
presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Empirical Hypotheses 
The objective of this paper is to test whether managerial behavioral biases are likely to affect 
corporate risk management decisions. As documented by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) in 
their excellent review of the growing literature on behavioral corporate finance, several 
managerial behavioral biases have been shown to affect corporate decisions. We investigate the 
potential effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate risk management decisions. 
Managerial overconfidence has been widely documented in the recent literature (see, for 
example, Russo and Schoemaker (1992), Griffin and Tversky (1992) and Heaton (2002)). 
Overconfident managers systematically overestimate the probability of good outcomes (and 
correspondingly, underestimate the probability of bad outcomes) resulting from their actions 
(Heaton (2002)). In a dynamic setting, overconfidence coupled with biased self-attribution 
(Miller and Ross (1975)), where managers credit themselves for successes while blaming outside 
factors for failures, cause managerial overconfidence to increase following successes but not 
commensurately decrease following failures (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998); 
Gervais and Odean (2001)). The implications for corporate financial decisions are that 
overconfident managers act more decisively and aggressively, and that this behavior intensifies 
following successes. Several studies, including Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Ben-David, 
Graham and Harvey (2007), Billett and Qian (2008), and Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011),   6
report empirical evidence consistent with overconfident managers, while Barber and Odean 
(2000) report similar evidence in the context of overconfident individual investors. 
We test the overconfidence hypothesis in the context of corporate risk management. 
There is ample evidence that managers incorporate their market views into their hedging 
decisions, and thus hedge “selectively.”
7 Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and 
Haushalter (2006) document significant time-series variation in the size of the hedge positions of 
gold mining firms, which may reflect managers’ changing market views about future gold prices. 
In the absence of an information advantage with respect to gold prices, however, incorporating a 
manager’s private market view into a hedging program is inconsistent with neoclassical theories 
of risk management. Indeed, Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter 
(2006) do not find systematic gains from selective hedging, which implies that managers of gold 
mining firms do not possess an information advantage on average. Thus, the significant time-
series variation in firms’ hedge positions is likely to be inconsistent with rational explanations of 
corporate hedging. 
The managerial overconfidence hypothesis applied in the context of corporate speculation 
implies that managers grow more overconfident following past speculative successes, leading to 
a more aggressive pursuit of speculative strategies, while past failures would diminish managers’ 
willingness to speculate to a lesser degree, if at all. Hence, we expect an asymmetric relation 
between speculative activities and the past performance of speculative positions, where managers 
increase their speculative activities following successes in speculation, while they do not 
commensurately decrease speculation following failures in speculation. 
 
                                                 
7 See Dolde (1993), Stultz (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), and Glaum (2002).    7
3. Data and Methodology 
Our sample consists of 92 gold mining firms in North America, which are included in the Gold 
and Silver Hedge Outlook, a quarterly survey of derivatives activities conducted by Ted Reeve, 
an analyst at Scotia McLeod, from 1989 through 1999, when he discontinued the survey.
8 These 
92 firms represent the majority of firms in the gold mining industry (see Tufano (1996) and 
Adam and Fernando (2006)). Firms not included in the survey tend to be small or privately held 
corporations.  
The survey contains information on all outstanding gold derivatives positions, their size 
and direction, maturities, and the respective delivery prices for each instrument (forwards, spot-
deferred contracts, gold loans and options). This derivatives data is described in detail in Adam 
(2002). We hand-collect operational data: gold production (in ounces), production costs per 
ounce of gold, and gold reserves, from firms’ annual reports. The data on firm characteristics 
such as size, market-to-book, leverage, liquidity, existence of a credit rating, and payment of 
quarterly dividends comes from Compustat. Data on managerial compensation is from 
ExecuComp, supplemented by hand collection from proxy statements where necessary. All 
variable notations and definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
We measure the extent of derivatives usage at a given point in time t with time to 











 , (1) 
where N(i)t is the sum of the firm’s derivatives positions in place at time t (in ounces of gold) 
that mature in i years, weighted by their respective deltas, as in Tufano (1996). Et[Prodt+i] is the 
                                                 
8 While some post-2000 hedging data is available from accounting disclosures and other sources, this data lacks the 
level of detail and consistency across firms that has made the Scotia McLeod survey data invaluable for many 
empirical studies of corporate hedging, including Tufano (1996, 1998), Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), Adam and 
Fernando (2006), and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006).   8
firms’s expectation of its gold production (in ounces of gold) at time t+i a s  o f  t i m e  t. The 
maturity i of a derivatives position can be 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 years, although most derivatives activity 
takes place with contracts that mature within three years. To check robustness of our results we 
aggregate (a) contracts with 1-3 years maturity and (b) contracts with 1-5 years maturity.  
The derivatives survey reports the expected production for each hedge horizon i 
whenever a firm has derivatives positions outstanding that mature in i years. If a firm does not 
hedge a particular maturity, then the expected production figures are missing. In this case we use 
the actual gold production in year t+i. Since most firms do not hedge their gold production 
beyond three years, the problem of missing expected production figures increases with the hedge 
horizon. Therefore, we also define an alternate hedge ratio, HRRes(i)t, that does not rely on 
expected production but scales a firm’s total derivatives position by its total gold reserve (see Jin 







Reserve   Gold
) (
) ( Res  . (2) 
In addition to helping overcome potential issues associated with missing production data, scaling 
by reserves is also a useful robustness check of our analysis using production-based hedge ratios, 
due to the possibility that some time-series variation in the production-based hedge ratio may be 
due to unplanned variations in expected production rather than a change in the firm’s derivatives 
positions.  
We observe the above hedge ratios every quarter from December 1989 to December 
1999. This data allows us to measure the extent of speculation (selective hedging) by the time-
series volatility in hedge ratios. To obtain quarterly volatility estimates while also maximizing 
the number of observations in our relatively small sample, we follow the existing literature on 
volatility estimation and calculate volatility by the absolute change in a firm’s hedge ratio.   9
Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) review the large body of literature that estimates time-
varying volatility using two daily observations: either open and close, or high and low. They 
argue, in particular, that the range, or the difference in log prices between daily high and daily 
low, is a good proxy for daily volatility. To quote, “…the discretized stochastic volatility model 
is difficult to estimate because the sample path of the asset price within each interval is not fully 
observed…. In practice, we are forced to use discretely observed statistics of the sample paths, 
such as the absolute or squared returns over each interval, to draw inferences about the 
discretized log volatilities and their dynamics…” The measure advocated by Alizadeh et al. 
(2002) has been used not only in market microstructure but also, for example, in asset pricing 
research. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) mention using the range-based volatility 
measure as a proxy for innovations in aggregate market volatility, in order to estimate whether 
exposure to these innovations is a priced risk. Thus, we define the extent of speculation in 
quarter t, Vt, as the absolute value of the difference in the natural logarithms of the hedge ratios 
at the beginning and the end of each quarter.
9  
  )] / ( [ 1   t t t HR HR LN ABS V  (3) 
This approach permits us to obtain quarterly volatility estimates, in contrast to (at best) annual 
volatility estimates that we would obtain using the time-series standard deviation of hedge 
ratios.
10 
                                                 
9 For the purpose of measuring percentage changes, whenever a firm reports a zero hedge (unless it reports a zero 
value in both the beginning and the end of the quarter), we substitute a very small value. The percentage change is 
then calculated as the difference of the natural logarithms from quarter (t-1) to quarter t. 
10 An apparent refinement would be to estimate predicted hedge ratios as in Adam and Fernando (2006) and use the 
hedge ratio residuals to compute speculation. However, as demonstrated by Adam and Fernando (2006) in their 
robustness checks, speculation computed using hedge ratio residuals does not yield substantively different results to 
speculation computed using total hedge ratios, which may be due in part to the inability of fundamental variables to 
explain the variation in hedge ratios.   10
We use several constructs to measure the past performance of firms’ derivatives 
activities. First, we compute the quarterly total cash flows generated from derivatives positions 
per ounce of gold hedged, as in Adam and Fernando (2006). Second, we recalculate the quarterly 
cash flows assuming a firm had maintained a constant hedge ratio (“benchmark cash flows”). 
The difference between the total derivatives cash flow and the cash flow computed using this 
fixed hedge ratio benchmark is the cash flow that we attribute to selective hedging.
11 Positive 
selective hedging cash flows constitute “speculative gains” and negative selective hedging cash 
flows constitute “speculative losses.” Selective hedging cash flow is an attractive measure 
because it reflects the part of the cash flow that results directly from managerial market timing, 
i.e., speculative, actions.
12 Finally, in addition to the above cash flow measures, we also calculate 
the quarterly derivatives book profit (or loss), which is computed as the quarterly change in the 
value of derivatives positions in dollars per ounce hedged. Please refer to Appendix 2 for the 
calculation of quarterly changes in the book value of derivatives positions. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the descriptive statistics and the correlations for the different hedge 
ratios and hedge ratio volatility measures.  
[Place Tables 1 & 2 about here] 
Several observations emerge from these tables. Consistent with Adam and Fernando 
(2006), selective hedging cash flows average at around zero, suggesting that selective hedging 
does not add value to the firm on a systematic basis. We notice that the hedge ratios of different 
maturities are all significantly correlated with one another. However, the correlations are weaker 
between shorter-maturity and longer-maturity hedge ratios. The aggregate hedge ratios are less 
                                                 
11 Adam and Fernando (2006) provide details on the computation of these cash flows. 
12 For example, suppose a manager believes that the gold price is going to rise and therefore reduces the hedge ratio 
relative to the benchmark. If she is correct in her forecast, then the total derivatives cash flow will be negative (since 
she is short overall) but the selective component will be positive: the firm does not lose as much on the hedge as it 
could have.    11
than perfectly correlated with one another, substantiating the need to check robustness of our 
results with respect to different hedge ratio definitions. The same general conclusions hold for 
the hedge ratio volatilities. 
 
3.1  Basic methodology 
Our basic methodology is to run panel regressions with firm fixed effects in order to focus on the 
time-series variation in hedge ratios and hedge ratio volatility. Our test of managerial 
overconfidence, which is based on the relationship between hedge ratio volatility and past 
speculative gains and losses, needs to be restricted to active hedgers only (i.e., firms that have 
non-zero hedge ratios and report non-zero cash flows in the previous period). This requirement is 
due to the fact that the overconfidence hypothesis conditions managerial activity on the results of 
previous activity. In addition, leaving non-hedging firm-quarters in the sample may lead to a 
spurious regression result with zero past cash flows from derivatives positions “explaining” zero 
hedge ratio volatility next period. Hence, we estimate the panel regression with firm fixed effects 
on a reduced sample of active hedgers.  
For robustness we repeat our tests using the two-step Heckman (1979) procedure with 
selection. In the first stage, we model the existence of hedging activity as a function of variables 
that are predicted by extant hedging theory to be determinants of hedging -- firm size, market-to-
book ratio, liquidity, leverage, dividend payment, credit rating, and the likelihood of financial 
distress (Tufano (1996), Haushalter (2000)). We say that a firm has hedging activity if two 
conditions hold: (1) the beginning or the end-of-quarter hedge ratio is non-zero; and (2) cash 
flows from derivatives positions in the previous quarter are non-zero. In the second stage of the 
Heckman two-step procedure, we test whether the hedge ratio volatility is driven by past success   12
of the derivatives positions for the firms that exhibit hedging activity as described above. Further 
methodological details are provided in Section 4. 
Our unique data permits us to employ a methodology that is distinct from and 
complements the techniques employed in the other studies of corporate managerial biases. 
Existing studies fall under two categories: surveys, as in Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey 
(2007); and cross-sectional studies, as in Malmendier and Tate (2005). These studies examine a 
variety of characteristics that are likely to affect the degree to which managers exhibit behavioral 
biases. Examples include personal and professional characteristics (age, tenure, education, etc.) 
and personal wealth management practices (the tendency to hold disproportionate amounts of 
one’s own firm’s stock, and the failure to exercise vested options). The question in these studies 
is whether cross-sectional differences across managers explain actions that are attributable to 
behavioral biases. Our work complements the prior studies by focusing on time-series patterns 
that may characterize behavioral biases, examining how managers as a group respond to market 
movements and their own past performance. As noted before, this complementary perspective is 
made possible by our unique data set, which contains quarterly observations on all outstanding 
gold derivatives positions of a sample of 92 North American gold mining firms from 1989-1999. 
The key advantage of this data set is that we are able to infer actual derivatives transactions and 
the corresponding cash flows as well as observe the estimates of expected production, which is a 
unique feature of our data set. 
 
3.2  Controlling for alternative explanations 
An alternative explanation for an increase in speculation following high derivatives cash 
flows derived from speculation is that managers simply have more cash to use at their discretion   13
or that positive cash flows from speculation improve the firm’s financial strength. We control for 
a firm’s liquidity and financial strength to account for this possibility by including a dividend 
dummy, rating dummy, quick ratio, leverage and Altman’s (1968) Z-score as control variables.
13 
Another possibility is that although selective hedging does not benefit shareholders, it 
may benefit managers due to incentive compensation (Stulz (1996)). While the potential link 
between selective hedging and managerial compensation is explored in several recent studies, the 
results are mixed, with only weak evidence that managerial compensation significantly affects 
selective hedging and no consensus on the direction of the relationship.
14 Nevertheless, we 
control for managerial compensation variables to allow for this possibility in our hedging 
sample.  
Finally, as pointed out by Campbell and Kracaw (1999), financially constrained firms 
with good projects may speculate more to generate more funds for optimal investment. 
Investment opportunities may also affect the degree to which firms choose to hedge due to the 
need to raise external financing (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)). We account for both 
financial constraints and growth opportunities by including standard control variables such as 
debt-to-equity and market-to-book ratios. 
  
4. Empirical Evidence: Managerial Responses to Speculative Gains and Losses 
In this section, we test the managerial overconfidence hypothesis by examining the relation 
between speculation (measured by hedge ratio volatility) and past speculative gains and losses. 
                                                 
13 It is important to note, however, that in contrast to positive speculative cash flows from derivatives, positive total 
derivatives cash flow need not make the overall financial position of the firm stronger because positive hedge cash 
flows on derivatives positions would typically offset losses due to gold price declines. 
14 Géczy, Minton and Schrand (2007) find that CEO stock price sensitivity is negatively related to speculation while 
CFO stock price sensitivity is positively related. Beber and Fabbri (2006) find no consistent relation between CEO 
delta and selective hedging. Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) find no systematic relationship between selective 
hedging and several ownership and compensation measures.    14
The overconfidence hypothesis maintains that, all else equal, if past speculative activity was 
successful, resulting in cash flow gains, then the manager will increase his/her speculative 
activities in the next period. If, however, past speculative activity was unsuccessful, resulting in 
cash flow losses, then there would be no commensurate reduction in speculative activities. In 
other words, we expect an asymmetric relation between the degree of speculative activity and 
past speculative cash flows. 
 
4.1 Initial panel regressions without asymmetry effects 
We begin by examining the general relationship between derivatives cash flows and subsequent 
speculative activity. Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the firm fixed effects panel regressions of 
the hedge ratio volatility on past cash flows and book profits from derivatives positions per 
ounce of gold hedged. We present the results for the volatility of the one-year hedge ratio, the 
three-year aggregate hedge ratio scaled by expected production, the three-year aggregate hedge 
ratio scaled by reserves, and the five-year hedge ratio scaled by reserves. Table 3 reports the 
results for a specification that employs total derivatives cash flows along with derivatives book 
profit as independent variables. Our interest in this specification is to investigate whether 
speculative activity responds to past derivatives cash flows and/or book profits. Table 4 reports 
the corresponding results using selective hedging cash flows (i.e., the speculative component of 
total derivatives cash flows), which is our primary variable of interest.  
[Place Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
Since we are interested in testing the hypothesis that successful past speculative 
derivatives activity will lead to higher speculation in the future, we perform these regressions 
after eliminating firm quarters where the firm had zero cash flows from derivatives positions,   15
and also eliminating observations where both beginning-of-quarter and end-of-quarter hedge 
ratios were zero. In all of the models, we include seasonal dummy variables as controls; 
however, doing so is mostly a concern with the one-year hedge ratio, which exhibits some 
seasonal variation, whereas the aggregate hedge ratios exhibit virtually no seasonal variation. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, we also control for firm characteristics that may affect a firm’s level of 
speculative activity, such as liquidity, financial strength, and growth opportunities. 
  As evident from Table 3, we observe a positive relationship between hedge ratio 
volatility and previous quarter total derivatives cash flows, which is robust to model specification 
in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance. However, we do not observe any 
relationship with the book profit. This result indicates that speculation responds to derivatives 
cash flows but not to book profits. We then refine the specification to employ the selective 
hedging component of derivatives cash flows. From Table 4, we observe that the relationship 
between hedge ratio volatility and selective hedging cash flows is positive and significant, 
providing evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the success of past selective hedging leads to 
higher levels of speculation in the future. Again, we do not find a significant relationship with 
book profits. Nonetheless, speculation is also positively related to benchmark cash flows, which 
is consistent with our observation in Table 3 for total derivatives cash flows. 
Given that the tests reported in Tables 3 and 4 were performed on a reduced sample, we 
next perform robustness checks to control for the possibility of selection bias by allowing for the 
two sequential decisions of the firm, (1) whether or not to be a derivatives user and (2) 
conditional on being a derivatives user, how much to speculate. We estimate the two-step 
Heckman procedure with selection. In the first stage, we estimate a PROBIT model, where the 
dependent variable is equal to zero if (1) either the firm has zero hedge ratios in both the   16
beginning and the end of quarter t; or (2) the firm had zero cash flows from hedging operations 
in quarter t-1.
15 We estimate the likelihood of derivatives usage as a function of several firm 
characteristics: size, market-to-book ratio, the ratio of book debt to book equity, quick ratio, 
dividend-payer status, existence of a credit rating, and Altman’s Z-score. In the second stage, we 
estimate the relationship between hedge ratio volatility and past cash flows and book profits from 
derivatives positions conditional on the firm being a derivatives user. The results from the two 
stages of the Heckman procedure are presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  
[Place Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
From Table 5, we observe that firms that use derivatives are large firms with low growth 
opportunities (as indicated by low market-to-book ratios), conservative leverage policies, and 
higher financial constraints/low liquidity. These results are consistent with previously reported 
findings by Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) and 
Haushalter (2000). 
The Heckman second-stage results reported in Table 6 are consistent with our previous 
findings reported in Tables 3 and 4. In all regression specifications, we observe a positive and 
significant relationship between hedge ratio volatility and past cash flows from derivatives 
positions, whether total derivatives cash flows or selective hedging cash flows and benchmark 
cash flows. We observe no relationship between hedge ratio volatility and past book profits from 
derivatives positions.  
We next perform one more robustness check to control for managerial compensation as 
discussed in Section 3.3. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the regressions of hedge ratio 
volatility on past cash flows while controlling for the managerial compensation variables (delta 
                                                 
15 We also run the first stage estimation using only the first condition (non-zero hedge ratios) to define hedging 
activity and obtain similar results. They are not reported due to space constraints but are available on request.   17
and vega) of the CEO and the CFO. The regressions are univariate due to the limited number of 
managerial compensation observations in our sample. However, the regressions indicate that 
overall, our inference regarding the effect of derivatives cash flows on speculation remains 
unaffected while the managerial compensation variables are statistically insignificant. 
[Place Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
 
4.2 Accounting for asymmetry effects 
Having established the relation between speculation and derivatives cash flows, we now turn to 
our test for the presence of managerial overconfidence in our sample firms. We do so by 
examining the asymmetry in the relationship between derivatives cash flows and speculation. For 
this purpose, we run the following regression with dummy variables: 
  t t t t t CONTROLS I SCF b I SCF b a V           2 1 2 1 1 1                                  (4) 
In this regression, I1 (I2) is a dummy variable that equals one if the selective hedging cash flow 
during the last quarter was positive (negative) and zero otherwise. We choose selective hedging 
cash flow to be the dependent variable because selective hedging cash flow is the direct 
consequence of speculative decisions made by the manager in the past, and therefore is more 
directly related to the extent to which past speculation was successful than total cash flows. We 
include the benchmark cash flow, along with the firm characteristics, in the matrix of control 
variables.
16 
We estimate this regression first on a reduced sample of firm-quarters for active hedgers 
and next, using the Heckman two-step procedure for robustness. The results of the second-stage 
                                                 
16 Nevertheless, we check robustness of the results to using total derivatives cash flow and find that the general 
result is similar in spirit although less significant. The results are not reported but are available upon request.   18
Heckman procedure with controls are presented in Table 9.
17 While the asymmetric response of 
hedge ratio volatility to selective cash flow persists in this alternative specification, the 
significance of the benchmark cash flow variable is diminished. 
[Place Table 9 about here] 
  From both Table 8 and Table 9, we observe that the relationship between hedge ratio 
volatility and past selective hedging cash flows is strongly positive only if the past selective 
hedging cash flows are positive. A one-standard deviation increase in selective hedging cash 
flow leads to a 0.2774 increase in the quarterly volatility of the one-year hedge ratio, which is 
22.5% of the sample mean of 1.2325. When selective hedging cash flows are negative, however, 
we observe no significant relationship except in the case of one-year hedge ratio volatility. 
However, while we would still expect a positive coefficient for one-year hedge ratio volatility 
with negative selective hedging cash flows if the relation between speculation and selective 
hedging cash flow is symmetric (since speculation should decrease as speculation losses 
increase) this is the opposite of what we observe for one-year hedge ratio volatility. Thus, our 
evidence here strongly supports an asymmetric relation between speculative activity and 
selective hedging cash flows, which confirms the managerial overconfidence hypothesis for our 
sample firms. Managers increase speculative activity following successes (as their 
overconfidence rises) but do not symmetrically reduce it following failures. This result is robust 
to the inclusion of firm characteristics that may affect the fundamental hedging needs of the firm, 
as well as to controlling for possible selection biases. 
 
                                                 
17 The results of the panel regressions on the reduced sample are qualitatively similar to the Heckman regressions 
and are available on request.   19
4.3 Other robustness checks 
In addition to controlling for the rational explanations as laid out in Section 3.3, we also perform 
a few more robustness checks. First, past cash flows as well as derivatives book profits may be 
related to movements in the price of gold over the same quarter. This concern is mitigated by the 
fact that derivatives cash flows are the result of hedging decisions taken in the distant past as 
well as more current decisions and therefore, the recent change in the price of gold may not have 
a strong effect. Additionally, this issue is much less of a concern for selective hedging cash 
flows, which is our main variable of interest. Nevertheless, in unreported tests we include the 
change in the price of gold in our regressions without a substantive effect on our results. In the 
two-stage Heckman framework, we also allow for the relationship between hedge ratio volatility 
and past selective hedging cash flows to be a function of the beginning-of-quarter hedge ratio. In 
these robustness tests, also available upon request, we continue to find that hedge ratio volatility 
is positively related to past derivatives cash flows and that the relationship is robustly stronger 




We add to the growing literature that documents the influence of managerial overconfidence in a 
variety of corporate finance settings, including investment and capital structure policy, mergers 
and acquisitions, security offerings and investment bank relationships, by showing that the effect 
of overconfidence also extends to corporate hedging decisions. We document a positive 
relationship between speculation and past speculative gains, without a corresponding relation 
between speculation and past speculative losses. This asymmetry supports the conjecture that the   20
financial success of past speculative decisions increases managerial overconfidence, leading 
managers to elevate their levels of speculation, while losses do not reduce managerial 
overconfidence because managers tend to attribute failures to bad luck. Our findings provide the 
first evidence that corporate risk management practices are affected by behavioral managerial 
biases, and suggest that recognizing the presence of these biases will help bridge the gap between 
the theory and practice of corporate risk management.   21
Appendix 1: Variable Notations and Definitions 
Hedge Ratios: 
HR1 – HR5 are the hedge ratios from one- to five-year maturities, respectively; 
A3 is the aggregate hedge ratio that aggregates the hedge positions over one-, two-, and three-
year horizons, scaled by the expected production;  
A3R is  the aggregate hedge ratio that aggregates the hedge positions over one-, two-, and three-
year horizons, scaled by gold reserves;  
A5R is  the aggregate hedge ratio that aggregates the hedge positions over one-, two-, three-, 
four- and five-year horizons, scaled by gold reserves. 
Hedge Ratio Volatility: 
V1 – V5 are the quarterly volatilities of the one- through five-year hedge ratios, respectively. 
Quarterly volatility is the absolute value of the difference in the natural logarithms of the end-of- 
quarter and beginning-of-quarter hedge ratio levels. 
V6 – V8 are the corresponding quarterly volatilities for A3, A3R, and A5R, respectively. 
Derivatives Cash Flows: 
CF are the total cash flows from derivatives positions (in $ per ounce hedged) estimated as in 
Adam and Fernando (2006);  
SCF and BCF are the selective and the benchmark cash flows, estimated as in Adam and 
Fernando (2006);  
RBK is the change in the book value of the derivatives positions per ounce hedged (see 
Appendix 2). 
Firm Characteristics: 
SIZ is the logarithm of the market value of assets ($ million);    22
MB is the market-to-book ratio of assets; 
DE is the ratio of book debt to book equity;  
QCK is the quick ratio;  
DIV is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; 
RAT is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a credit rating;  
Z is the Altman’s (1968) Z-score (higher value of Z corresponds to lower probability of 
bankruptcy).  
DELTA_CEO (CFO) is the change in the dollar value of the CEO’s (CFO’s) wealth derived 
from ownership of stock and stock options in the firm when the firm’s stock price changes by 
one percent, calculated according to the methodology of Core and Guay (2002). We calculate the 
aggregate delta of the executive’s compensation as the sum of the deltas of the options holdings 
and the delta of the stock holdings. 
VEGA_CEO (CFO) is the change in the dollar value of the CEO’s (CFO’s) wealth derived 
from ownership of stock and stock options in the firm when the annualized standard deviation of 
the firm’s stock price changes by 0.01, following Core and Guay (2002). We calculate the 
aggregate vega of the executive’s compensation as the sum of the vegas of the executive’s 
options holdings, following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). 
GLD is the change in the price of gold over the quarter;   23
Appendix 2: Calculation of Quarterly Derivatives Book Profits 
 
For the calculations of derivatives book profits, we use delta of the linear positions (which is 
equal to -1) and delta of option positions, which we back out from the total delta of the firm. We 
calculate the delta of option positions at the end of the quarter as the firm’s total delta plus the 
number of linear contracts: 
  Loan t Spot t Forward t Total t Option t N N N , , , , ,                                    (A1) 
In (A1), Δt,Total is  the total delta of the firm, Nt,Forward is the number of forward contracts, Nt,Spot is 
the number of spot contracts, and Nt,Loan is the number of loan contracts. Then, for each quarter, 
we calculate the minimum of the two hedge positions,  
  ) , 1 , , , min( Linear t Linear t t NLIN N N MIN    (A2) 
  ) , 1 , , , min( Option t Option t t NOPT N N MIN     (A3) 
Above, MINNLIN,t is the smaller of the beginning-of-quarter and end-of-quarter linear positions 
(forward plus spot plus loan) and MINNOPT,t is the smaller of the beginning-of-quarter and end-of-
quarter option positions. Obviously, at this step we lose observations where the size of the 
position is missing either at the beginning or at the end of the quarter. 
Next, we calculate the delta MΔt,Option of option positions as the beginning-of-quarter 
delta Δt-1,Option, divided by the beginning-of-quarter option position Nt-1,Option, multiplied by the 
smaller of the beginning-of-quarter and the end-of-quarter positions: 
  Option t t NOPT Option t Option t N MIN M , 1 , , 1 , /         (A4) 
If both option positions N,t,Option and Nt-1,Option are zero, then delta is set to zero. Next, we use the 
option delta MΔt,Option to calculate the total book profits from linear positions BKt,Linear, from 
option positions BKt,Option, and from all positions BKt, where GOLDt is the price of one ounce of 
gold at the end of quarter t:   24
  ) ( 1 , , t t t NLIN Linear t GOLD GOLD MIN BK        (A5) 
  ) 1 ( ) ( 1 , ,        t t Option t Option t GOLD GOLD M BK    (A6) 
  Option t Linear t t BK BK BK , ,      (A7) 
Finally, to adjust for the scale effect, we scale the total profits by the average size of the 
firm’s position to obtain relative book profits from option positions RBKt,Option, from linear 
positions RBKt,Linear, and from all positions RBKt,. The average size of the linear position  Linear N  
is equal to the average number of linear contracts reported by the firm over all quarters of the 
sample period in which a non-zero linear position is reported. The average size of the option 
positions  Option N  is computed similarly. 
  Option Option t Option t N BK RBK / , ,     (A8) 
  Linear Linear t Linear t N BK RBK / , ,     (A9) 
  Option t Linear t t RBK RBK RBK , ,      (A10) 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Hedge Ratios, Hedge Volatility, Cash Flows, and Firm Characteristics 
Descriptive statistics are estimated on the pooled dataset. The sample consists of quarterly observations from 1989-
1999 for a sample of 92 North American gold mining firms as reported in Gold and Silver Hedge Outlook. The table 
reports summary statistics for the following variables: hedge ratios of various maturities as well as aggregate hedge 
ratios estimated as the sum of the firm’s derivatives positions in place in quarter t (in ounces of gold), weighted by 
their respective deltas, scaled either by expected production or by reserves; hedge ratio volatilities estimated as the 
absolute value of the ratio of natural logarithms of the end-of-quarter to the beginning-of-quarter hedge ratio; total 
cash flows from derivatives positions per ounce hedged as well as selective and benchmark cash flows, which are 
estimated as in Adam and Fernando (2006); derivatives book profit equal to the change in the book value of the 
derivatives positions per ounce hedged (see Appendix 2 for calculation); change in the price of gold per ounce; firm 
size measured as the logarithm of the market value of assets; market-to-book ratio of assets; ratio of book debt to 
book equity; quick ratio; dividend dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; credit rating 




One-year hedge ratio 0.2874 0.3179 0.0000 1.0000 1875
Two-year hedge ratio 0.1552 0.2418 0.0000 1.0000 1879
Three-year hedge ratio 0.0779 0.1722 0.0000 1.0000 1901
Four-year hedge ratio 0.0363 0.1135 0.0000 1.0000 1935
Five-year hedge ratio 0.0271 0.1092 0.0000 0.9990 1952
Aggregate 3-yr. ratio, prod. 0.1716 0.2402 0.0000 1.0000 1460
Aggregate 3-yr. ratio, res. 0.0465 0.0738 0.0000 0.6620 1460
Aggregate 5-yr. ratio, res. 0.0575 0.0961 0.0000 0.9857 1460
Volatiliy, 1-yr. ratio 1.2325 2.9044 0.0000 12.4055 1665
Volatility, 2-yr. ratio 1.2304 2.9902 0.0000 12.7594 1660
Volatility, 3-yr. ratio 0.8524 2.5275 0.0000 11.5129 1694
Volatility, 4-yr. ratio 0.8324 2.5702 0.0000 11.5129 1732
Volatility, 5-yr. ratio 0.5135 2.0428 0.0000 11.4742 1761
Volatility, 3-yr. agg. ratio, prod. 0.6838 2.0897 0.0000 11.5000 1253
Volatility, 3-yr. agg. ratio, res. 0.6477 1.8500 0.0000 10.5740 1262
Volatility, 5-yr. agg. ratio, res. 0.6867 1.8970 0.0000 11.2149 1304
Total derivative cash flow 4.8063 16.2041 -95.9039 180.1249 1788
Selective cash flow 0.3680 10.5898 -66.7713 201.8647 1801
Benchmark cash flow 4.4377 16.7540 -90.4059 180.1249 1788
Derivative book profit 2.1401 16.4882 -181.3730 106.0881 1750
Change in the price of gold -3.0569 17.7753 -48.9000 52.0000 1781
Size 5.5771 1.7608 1.0460 9.3604 1858
Market-to-Book ratio 1.9381 1.1137 0.2985 9.0819 1647
Debt-to-Equity ratio 0.4619 1.0772 0.0000 21.2707 1205
Quick ratio 4.2476 9.7254 0.0065 141.5172 1161
Dividend dummy 0.4701 0.4993 0.0000 1.0000 1289
Rating dummy 0.2454 0.4305 0.0000 1.0000 1312
Altman's Z-score 4.9900 13.5111 -22.8560 126.8310 1618
Number of
Deviation Observations
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
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Table 2 
Correlations Across Hedge Ratios and Across Hedge Ratio Volatilities 
Correlations are estimated on the pooled dataset. The sample consists of quarterly observations over 1989-1999 for a 
sample of 92 North American gold mining firms as reported in Gold and Silver Hedge Outlook. HR1 – HR5 are 
hedge ratios with one- to five- year maturity, respectively; V1 – V5 are their respective volatilities; A3 is the 
aggregate 3-year hedge ratio scaled by expected production, A3R is the aggregate 3-year hedge ratio scaled by 
reserves, and A5R is the aggregate five-year hedge ratio scaled by reserves, and V6 – V8 are their respective 
volatilities. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Correlations of the hedge ratios





































Panel B: Correlations of hedge ratio volatilities
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Table 3 
Relationship between Speculation and Past Total Derivatives Cash Flows 
The table presents the results of the panel regressions with firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the volatility 
of the hedge ratio. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the logs of the hedge 
ratio in the end and the beginning of the quarter. The independent variables are as follows: CF is the total derivatives 
cash flow in the previous quarter; RBK is the change in the book value of derivatives positions in the previous 
quarter. Seasonal dummies are included in each of the models. The regressions include the following firm 
characteristics as control variables: SIZ, firm size measured as the logarithm of the market value of assets; MB, 
market-to-book ratio of assets; DE, ratio of book debt to book equity; QCK, quick ratio; DIV, dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; RAT, dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a credit rating; and Z, 
Altman’s Z-score. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics 

















(3.60) (2.24) (3.03) (1.53) (3.54) (2.95) (3.53) (2.89)
RBK 0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0038 -0.0003 -0.0021
(0.91) (-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.74) (-1.29) (-1.68) (-0.23) (-0.97)
SIZ -0.1817 -0.3584 -0.0319 0.0572
(-0.39) (-1.18) (-0.09) (0.20)
Z 0.0730
* 0.0787 0.0458 0.0490
*
(1.36) (1.64) (1.29) (1.91)
QCK 0.0212 -0.0208 -0.0342 -0.0127





(-2.64) (-1.76) (-1.53) (-1.98)
DE -0.1862 -0.2467 -0.4726
*** -0.3233
**
(-1.12) (-1.28) (-4.46) (-2.32)
DIV 0.2905 -0.2261 -0.2401 -0.6023
***
(0.68) (-0.70) (-1.07) (-3.52)
RAT -0.3583 -0.0684 -0.1324 -0.2063
(-0.68) (-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.77)
Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R
2  0.0304 0.0382 0.0263 0.0330 0.0379 0.0519 0.0204 0.0364
F-statistic 4.70 1.62 3.85 1.64 3.44 5.82 3.27 2.84
Observations 1112 638 788 465 854 529 1005 621
Clusters 84 65 65 48 61 51 63 53
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio  32
Table 4 
Relationship between Speculation and Past Selective Hedging Cash Flows 
The table presents the results of the panel regressions with firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the volatility 
of the hedge ratio. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the logs of the hedge 
ratio in the end and the beginning of the quarter. The independent variables are as follows: SCF is the selective 
hedging cash flow in the previous quarter; BCF is the benchmark cash flow in the previous quarter; RBK is the 
change in the book value of derivatives positions in the previous quarter. Seasonal dummies are included in each of 
the models. The regressions include the following firm characteristics as control variables: SIZ, firm size measured 
as the logarithm of the market value of assets; MB, market-to-book ratio of assets; DE, ratio of book debt to book 
equity; QCK, quick ratio; DIV, dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; RAT, dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm reports a credit rating; and Z, Altman’s Z-score. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 


























(3.56) (2.15) (2.95) (1.26) (3.39) (2.50) (3.40) (2.49)
RBK 0.0021 -0.0117 -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0040
* -0.0004 -0.0023
(0.96) (-0.73) (-0.72) (-0.86) (-1.36) (-1.77) (-0.30) (-1.08)
SIZ -0.1851 -0.3901 -0.0454 0.0413
(-0.40) (-1.28) (-0.13) (0.14)
Z 0.0736 0.0825 0.0493 0.0514
**
(1.37) (1.70) (1.36) (1.96)
QCK 0.0205 -0.0239 -0.0382 -0.0156






(-2.64) (-1.87) (-1.64) (-2.00)
DE -0.1871 -0.2505 -0.4789
*** -0.3268
**
(-1.12) (-1.31) (-4.65) (-2.36)
DIV 0.2899 -0.2042 -0.2401 -0.5993
***
(0.68) (-0.67) (-1.10) (-3.58)
RAT -0.3553 -0.0431 -0.1203 -0.1940
(-0.67) (-0.12) (-0.40) (-0.73)
Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R
2  0.0308 0.0384 0.0267 0.0349 0.0399 0.0567 0.0229 0.0434
F-statistic 3.88 1.50 3.62 1.98 3.15 6.15 3.02 2.90
Observations 1112 638 788 465 854 529 1005 621
Clusters 84 65 65 48 61 51 63 53
(5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
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Table 5 
Determinants of Hedging Activity: First Stage of the Two-Step Heckman Regression With Selection 
The table reports the results of the PROBIT model. The dependent variable is the hedging activity dummy equal to 
zero if (1) either the firm had zero hedge ratios in both the beginning and the end of quarter t; or (2) the firm had 
zero cash flows from hedging operations in quarter t-1. The independent variables are: firm size measured as the 
logarithm of the market value of assets; market-to-book ratio of assets; ratio of book debt to book equity; quick 
ratio; dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports 
a credit rating; and Altman’s Z-score. Z-statistics are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Hedge Ratio Volatility Conditional on Hedging Activity:  
Second Stage of the Two-Step Heckman Regression with Selection 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the two-step Heckman procedure. In the first stage (see Table 6), 
we estimate the likelihood of hedging activity in a given quarter. In the second stage, we estimate the relationship 
between hedge ratio volatility in quarter t versus cash flows and book profits from derivatives positions in quarter t-
1, conditional on hedging activity. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the 
logs of the hedge ratio from the beginning to the end of the quarter. CF is the total derivatives cash flow; SCF is 
selective hedging cash flow; BCF is the benchmark cash flow; RBK is the change in the book value of derivatives 
positions. Seasonal dummies are included in each model. The regressions control for the following firm 
characteristics: firm size measured as the logarithm of the market value of assets; market-to-book ratio of assets; 
ratio of book debt to book equity; quick ratio; dividend dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly 
dividend; credit rating dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a credit rating; and Altman’s Z-score. The 
regressions include the Inverse Mills ratio estimated on the first stage of the Heckman procedure. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported 



























(2.29) (2.27) (2.73) (2.49)
RBK -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0017
(-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.84) (-0.90) (-1.18) (-1.24) (-0.75) (-0.83)
Inverse Mills -3.7381 -3.7044 -1.2069 -1.0787 -3.1570 -2.9739 -1.5532 -1.3087
Ratio (-1.38) (-1.36) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-1.25) (-1.17) (-0.82) (-0.69)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R
2  0.0769 0.0770 0.0738 0.0749 0.0879 0.0916 0.0738 0.0786
F-statistic 5.32 4.96 2.97 2.73 3.10 3.33 2.44 2.99
Observations 585 585 442 442 526 526 614 614
Clusters 53 53 42 42 51 51 53 53
(5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves  35
Table 7 
Determinants of Hedge Ratio Volatility Conditional on Hedging Activity:  
Controlling for Managerial Compensation (CEO) 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the two-step Heckman procedure. In the first stage (see Table 6), 
we estimate the likelihood of hedging activity in a given quarter. In the second stage, we estimate the relationship 
between hedge ratio volatility in quarter t versus cash flows and book profits from derivatives positions in quarter t-
1, conditional on hedging activity. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the 
logs of the hedge ratio from the beginning to the end of the quarter. CF is the total derivatives cash flow; SCF is 
selective hedging cash flow; BCF is the benchmark cash flow; DELTA_CEO and VEGA_CEO are the managerial 
compensation sensitivities for the CEO. The regressions include the Inverse Mills ratio estimated on the first stage 
of the Heckman procedure. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-
statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported in parentheses.  
 
Intercept 0.2460 0.2453 1.4696 1.4616 1.0222 1.0261 1.7445 1.7351
(0.21) (0.21) (0.81) (0.81) (0.78) (0.78) (1.26) (1.24)
CF 0.0159 0.0183 0.0161
 ** 0.0171
 **
(1.35) (1.19) (2.08) (2.82)
SCF 0.0143 0.0169 0.0182
 ** 0.0212
 **
(0.79) (0.81) (2.03) (2.74)
BCF 0.0164 0.0186 0.0155
 ** 0.0159
 **
(1.47) (1.25) (2.05) (2.72)
DELTA_CEO -0.1665 -0.1638 -0.1755 -0.1725 -0.1250 -0.1291 -0.1260 -0.1346
(-0.96) (-0.95) (-0.88) (-0.91) (-1.12) (-1.20) (-1.18) (-1.31)
VEGA_CEO 0.2002 0.1963 0.0822 0.0788 0.0738 0.0791 0.0176 0.0291
(1.18) (1.18) (0.35) (0.35) (0.53) (0.58) (0.12) (0.19)
Inverse Mills 0.1638 3.1772 1.9141 1.9362 1.0782 1.0549 0.2416 0.2517
Ratio (1.76) (1.75) (1.09) (1.11) (0.87) (0.86) (0.32) (0.34)
R
2  0.0545 0.0544 0.037 0.0371 0.0407 0.0409 0.0466 0.0478
F-statistic 2.08 1.64 1.46 1.16 2.19 1.91 3.41 3.30
Observations 146 146 106 106 127 127 155 155
Clusters 41 41 31 31 39 39 42 42
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
one-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
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Table 8 
Determinants of Hedge Ratio Volatility Conditional on Hedging Activity:  
Controlling for Managerial Compensation (CFO) 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the two-step Heckman procedure. In the first stage (see Table 6), 
we estimate the likelihood of hedging activity in a given quarter. In the second stage, we estimate the relationship 
between hedge ratio volatility in quarter t versus cash flows and book profits from derivatives positions in quarter t-
1, conditional on hedging activity. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the 
logs of the hedge ratio from the beginning to the end of the quarter. CF is the total derivatives cash flow; SCF is 
selective hedging cash flow; BCF is the benchmark cash flow; DELTA_CFO and VEGA_CFO are the managerial 
compensation sensitivities for the CEO. The regressions include the Inverse Mills ratio estimated on the first stage 
of the Heckman procedure. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-
statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported in parentheses.  
 
Intercept -1.4314 -1.4416 -4.1473 -4.1741 -3.1787 -3.1686
 * -1.6036 -1.6082

















(2.52) (2.46) (2.75) (2.55)
DELTA_CFO 0.2539 0.2132 0.5191 0.4235 0.3593 0.3118 0.2366 0.2194
(0.82) (0.74) (1.20) (1.02) (1.35) (1.22) (1.21) (1.16)
VEGA_CFO -0.1079 -0.0499 -0.1494 -0.0148 -0.0575 0.0109 -0.0678 -0.0478
(-0.40) (-0.19) (-0.48) (-0.05) (-0.33) (0.07) (-0.47) (-0.34)
Inverse Mills 3.3311 3.2148 2.9886 2.6094 2.0427 1.785 0.7582 0.9108
Ratio (1.08) (1.05) (1.22) (1.12) (1.18) (1.07) (1.15) (1.16)
R
2  0.1164 0.1209 0.176 0.1986 0.2023 0.2212 0.1606 0.1736
F-statistic 2.06 1.84 1.88 1.93 2.22 2.13 1.91 1.65
Observations 68 68 52 52 60 60 72 72
Clusters 22 22 17 17 20 20 23 23
(5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4)
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
   37
Table 9 
Testing for Asymmetric Volatility Response with Selection 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the two-step Heckman procedure. In the first stage, we estimate 
the likelihood of hedging activity in a given quarter. In the second stage, we estimate the following regression of the 
three-year aggregate hedge ratio volatility on past selective hedging cash flows from derivatives positions, while 
allowing for an asymmetric response. The volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the logs of 
the hedge ratio in the end and the beginning of the quarter. SCF is the selective hedging cash flow in the previous 
quarter. BCF is the benchmark cash flow. I1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the selective hedging cash flow 
during the last quarter was positive, and equals zero otherwise; and I2 is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
selective hedging cash flow was negative, and equals zero otherwise. The Inverse Mills ratio is obtained on the first 
stage of the Heckman procedure. The second-stage regressions includes: firm size measured as the logarithm of the 
market value of assets; market-to-book ratio of assets; ratio of book debt to book equity; quick ratio; dividend 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; credit rating dummy variable equal to one if a firm 
reports a credit rating; and Altman’s Z-score. Seasonal dummies are included in each model and ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported 














(3.85) (1.84) (5.09) (4.87)
SCF2 -0.0207 0.0147 0.0039 0.0025
(-1.19) (1.38) (0.43) (0.31)
BCF 0.0076 0.0097 0.0079 0.0057
*




Ratio (-2.15) (-1.45) (-2.19) (-1.08)
Dummies YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
R
2 0.077 0.0505 0.0879 0.0781
F-statistic 4.6 3.43 5.48 4.24
Observations 588 445 528 610
Clusters 53 41 51 53
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
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